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Introduction. 
 
 At first sight the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement 
of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Brussels 1968, (more 
commonly known as, and hereinafter referred to as the Brussels 
Convention) has all the appearances of being just another piece of EC 
law, dreamt up in Brussels by the vast European Union machinery 
pursuant to the Treaty of Rome as amended. Upon further examination, 
however, it becomes apparent that this document does not fall into any of 
the tidy boxes, of Regulation, Directive or Decision that usually account 
for the emanations from Brussels. This piece is not the product of the 
Council or the Commission. It is, in fact, an international treaty between 
the then Member States of the European Economic Community in 1968, 
as independent and sovereign states, to be subsequently amended and 
endorsed by each of the new Member States upon accession to, what is 
now known as, the European Union.  
 
 The Brussels Convention1 was updated as new members joined the 
EEC,2 as it was then known.3 Reports were also drawn up upon each 
                                                          
1
 OJ No L 229 31.12.72. 
2
 Luxembourg Convention 9th October 1978 re accession of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom, (OJ No. 
L 304, 30.10.1978). 
  Luxembourg Convention 25th October 1982 re accession of Greece, (OJ no. L388, 31.12.1982). 
  San Sebastian Convention on the accession of Spain and Portugal, (OJ 1989 L285/1). 
  The updated and consolidated Brussels Convention, upon the accession of Sweden, Finland and Austria, (OJ No. 
C 15, 15.1.97, page 1). 
3
 It was also used as a model for the Lugano Convention, OJ No L 319, 25.11.1988. 
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accession.4 The ECJ was granted jurisdiction to interpret the Convention 
under the Luxembourg Protocol,5 which was signed on the 3rd June 
1971, but which only came into force on the 1st September 1975. The 
1971 Protocol gives the ECJ power, negotiated on the basis on Article 
220(4) EC and Article 3(2) of each Act of Accession6 to give preliminary 
rulings on interpretation of the Convention at the request of the final 
appeal courts of each Member State. 
 
 It is the argument of this paper that because the Brussels 
Convention7 is not EU law it lacks potency and potential. By virtue of its 
International Law status the role of the ECJ is fundamentally different, 
and the potential for the Convention to govern the free movement of 
judgments from one jurisdiction to another, (a necessary corollary to the 
free movement of goods, establishment, services, workers and capital), is 
limited, thus adversely affecting the further development of the Single 
Market. 
 
The Identity of the Brussels Convention. 
 
 The issue of the identity of the Brussels Convention was brought 
sharply into focus in the case of Kongress Agentur Hagen v. Zeehahgen8 
when the Commission, in making its submissions to the ECJ, engaged in 
an amazing dichotomy of argument,9 which perhaps reflected its own 
ambivalence towards the exact nature of the Brussels Convention. The 
Commission’s oral and written presentations to the court in this case 
were completely at odds. The first of the arguments was to the effect that 
the Brussels Convention was recognized as a framework document and 
that other sources of law, such as national procedural rules, should be 
used to supplement it. 
                                                          
4
 Jenard-Moller Report, (OJ No. L 319, 25.11.1988). 
  Jenard Report, (OJ No. C 59, 5.3.1979). 
  Schlosser Report, (OJ 1979 C59). 
  Evrigenis and Kerameus Report, (OJ 1986 C289/1). 
  Almedia Cruz, Desantes Real, Jenard Report, (OJ 1990 C189/6). 
  (there appears to be no report published as yet upon the accession of Sweden, Finland and Austria). 
5
 [1990] OJ C No. 189/2. 
6
 Peter Stone, The Conflict of Laws, Longmans, 1995, page 155. 
7
   along with the subsequent Rome Convention on the Law applicable to Contractual Obligations, Rome 1980, OJ 
L 1980 No. 266/1 and the European Insolvency Convention EU Convention on International Insolvency 
Proceedings, Brussels November 23rd, 1995 35 ILM 1236 (1996). 
8
 Case C-365/88, Kongress Agentur Hagen v. Zeehaghen[1990] ECR 1-1845 at 1865. 
9
 Op cit, footnote no. 6. 
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 The second argument envisaged the Brussels Convention as a 
supreme law, to which national rules of jurisdiction should be 
subordinate. This argument reflects the view that laws based on the 
Treaty of Rome take precedence to national law, that the Convention 
forms “an integral part of the Community legal order”. It also recognizes 
that reference to national rules for supplemental purposes, (as required by 
the first argument), would lead to an uneven application of the provisions 
of the Convention, militating against its uniform application. 
 
 If the first argument (that the Brussels Convention is to be 
interpreted as a framework document to be supplemented by national 
procedural rules) prevails, then the Convention becomes merely a 
conduit through which 15 or more diverse and varied national rules of 
law and procedures can, in computer parlance, interface. There is no 
attempt to harmonize or co-ordinate existing law and procedure. Any 
attempt to move a judgment from one jurisdiction to another requires 
knowledge of three sets of laws and procedures, those of the originating 
jurisdiction, of the destination jurisdiction, and those of the Brussels 
Convention as the interjurisdictional conduit. The national and 
jurisdictional boundaries remain, imposing a barrier to the free 
movement of jurisdiction, thus delaying and hindering their pursuit of 
assets or persons, who enjoy the benefits of the free movement 
provisions of the EC Treaty. The European Single Market is thereby 
flawed, and business people operating in a flawed market will always be 
conscious of the added burden of enforcing a judgment on a trans-
national basis. 
 
 If the argument that the Convention is to take precedence over 
national law prevails, then new procedures for the implementation of the 
Convention would have to be developed by the ECJ. The end result of 
this would be one European wide substantive and procedural system for 
the movement of judgments from one Member State to another. That 
system would be applied in a similar manner within each of the Member 
States. European procedural rules would operate in addition to or instead 
of existing national systems for enforcing judgments. Thus normal 
lawyers in each member state would be fully familiar with the procedures 
to be applied from the instigation of the action, to its final execution. 
This certainty and clarity of law and procedure would provide a smooth 
running and a fully coordinated pan-European system, where judgments 
could move as freely as the persons or assets that they are pursuing 
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through the Member States, thus contributing to a true European Single 
Market. 
 
 This scenario would reflect the ideal situation, although it might 
encounter some initial objection from traditionalists, as it would require 
root and branch reform of the judgment enforcement procedures in each 
Member State. Such opposition has not, however, prevented the 
promulgation of European law before. This hypothesis of the Brussels 
Convention taking precedence over national law is based on the premise 
that the Convention can be regarded as law enacted pursuant to the 
Treaty of Rome. This is not in fact the case. The status of the Convention 
as an international document is reflected in the restricted access of 
litigants to the ECJ, and the limited competence of the ECJ on issues 
deriving from the convention, in contrast to exclusive competence on EC 
law issues. 
 
 Francesco Capotorti10 is of the opinion that the similarities between 
Article 177 referrals and Brussels Convention referrals are greater than 
the differences. The two systems are after all, being administered by the 
same court, for the same Member States. The differences in the two 
schemes, however, become all the more important given the above facts. 
Capotorti does acknowledge however that “a Convention between 
Member States can not be classified as a Community Measure” and 
“cannot be classified as an actual source of Community law”.11 
 
 Trevor C. Hartley appears to take a different view.12 He makes 
specific reference to the case of Peters v. ZNAV,13 which stated that “the 
concepts of matters relating to a contract” in the Article 5(1) of the 
Brussels Convention, should be determined by the ECJ, rather than the 
laws of one of the Contracting States.14 At issue in this case was the 
                                                          
10
 Fransco  Capotori: “Tasks of the Court of Justice and the System of the Brussels Convention”; European Court 
of Justice: Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments in Europe, Proceedings of the Colloquium on the Interpretation of 
the Brussels Convention by the Court of Justice considered in the context of the European Judicial Area. 
Luxembourg, 11and 12 March 191, Butterworths 1992, page 14. 
11
 ibid. at page 15. 
12
 in his article entitled “Unnecessary Europeanisation under the Brussels Jurisdiction and Judgments Convention: 
the Case of the Dissatisfied Sub-Purchaser E.L.R. 1994, 18(6), 506-516. Hartley defines “Europeanisation” as 
denoting the “process whereby a given question becomes a matter for  determination by Community law, rather 
than by national law”. 
13
 (reference for a preliminary ruling from the Hoge Radd der Nederlanden) Case 34/82 Peters v. ZNAV [1983] 
ECR 987. 
14
 at point 9 of the judgment. 
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payment of money on the basis of an association / member relationship.15 
Rather than arguing, as Hartley does, with reference to this case, that the 
ECJ does not exercise an undue restraining influence of the national 
courts through “Unnecessary Europeanisation”, it is a more tenable 
proposition to state that the national courts are given excessive 
competence (to the detriment of the ECJ) in the operation and 
interpretation of the Brussels Convention. This can result in an uneven 
approach to the interpretation and application of the Convention.16  
 
 Substantial differences exist between Article 177 referrals and 
those under the Brussels Convention. These include; 
1. A greater reliance upon national judiciary for applying and interpreting 
the law, 
2. A more restricted access to the ECJ under the Brussels Convention 
than under Article 177 referrals, 
3. An unwillingness of the ECJ to take a more pro-active and 
constitutional style approach to the application of the Brussels 
Convention, as evidenced in the case of Industrie Tessili Italiana v. 
Dunlop PG.17 
 
National Judiciary and Restricted Access to ECJ. 
 
 One of the causes for the undue reliance upon national judiciary is 
the much more restricted access to the ECJ under the Brussels 
Convention than under the EC Treaty. Only the courts listed in Article 2 
of the Luxembourg Protocol of 1971 can request the ECJ to give rulings 
under the Brussels Convention. When a matter is referred to it, the ECJ 
can only interpret the Convention by way of a preliminary ruling.18 The 
ECJ is not engaged in the application of law to specific cases, unlike in 
some instances under the EC Treaty. The ECJ itself has stated that its 
                                                          
15
 and whether obligations in question arose from membership, or whether is was necessary for such membership 
to be in conjunction with one or more decisions made by the organs of the association. He goes on to argue that 
this appears to breach the principle of subsidiarity, however, as subsidiarity is enshrined in Article 3b it would 
appear to cover EC law only, and not International Treaties such as the Brussels Convention). 
16
 The assumption of control exercised by the ECJ in the case of Peters should be interpreted as an attempt by the 
Court to mitigate the damage caused by undue reliance on national legal systems, where the underlying 
assumption of the Convention, (that all jurisdictions had a similar understanding of the term “contract”) had 
been undermined. 
 
17
 Case 12/76. Industrie Tessili Italiana v. Dunlop PG [1976] ECR 1473. 
18
 Marco Darmon Advocate General: “The Task of the Court of Justice and the System of the Brussels 
Convention”; European Court of Justice: Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments in Europe, Proceedings of the 
Colloquium on the Interpretation of the Brussels Convention by the Court of Justice considered in the context of 
the European Judicial Area. Luxembourg, 11and 12 March 191, Butterworths 1992, page 3 
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function, as envisaged in the protocol of 3 June 1971, “is to give 
interpretative rulings on the provisions of the Brussels Convention which 
are binding on the national courts which put questions to it”19 and is (as a 
result) reluctant to give merely advisory rulings, particularly if they 
appear to pertain to matters which are outwith the constraints of a rigid 
interpretation of the Convention and, as a result, fall to be dealt with 
under national law. 
 
Lack of Constitutional Style. 
 
 In the case of Industrie Tessili Italiana v. Dunlop PG,20 where 
there were differences in the rules of Contracting States concerning the 
place of performance of a contract, the ECJ decided that it was not in a 
position to provide a definition. In issues arising under the EC Treaty the 
ECJ has acted in the capacity of a Supreme Court21 developing law to 
strengthen the provisions of the EC Treaty. The ECJ can not, in its role as 
arbiter of the Brussels Convention, develop the Convention in order to 
fill in the gaps left by its drafters. The ECJ is equally unwilling to assume 
powers to itself under the Convention that it was not otherwise given,22 
an approach in complete variance with its much more pro-active 
approach for issues arising under the EC Treaty.23 
 
 The difference in the role of the ECJ under the two regimes can 
also be seen as a result of the fact that under Article 177 EC Treaty a 
ruling may be requested (optionally) by any court or tribunal of a 
Member State (provided it considers that a decision on the question is 
necessary to enable it to give judgment), with obligatory referral by the 
                                                          
19
  Case C-346/93 Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. City of Glasgow District Council [1995]ECR I-615. 
20
  Case 12/76. Industrie Tessili Italiana v. Dunlop PG [1976] ECR 1473. 
21
 in defense of the Constitutional Status that it appears at times to confer on the EC treaty. See Weatherhill S, 
“The Constitutional Court”, Chapter 6 in Law and Integration in the European Union, 1995, The Role and 
Structure of the European Judiciary now and in the future, and van Gerven, (1996) 21 ELRev. June, Cappellitti, 
Is the European Court of Justice “Running Wild”?, (1987) 12 ELRev 1. 
22
 as stated by Pieri in CMRL 34 867-893, 1997, “The 1969 Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters: the Evolution of Case Law of the Court of Justice 1992-1996”; 
“Any special jurisdiction had an exceptional character, and may not be extended if the norm does not 
specifically allow for”, referring to case of Case 32/88, Six Constructions Ltd. v. Humbert [1989] ECR 341. 
23
 as evidenced in J.J. Zwartveld and others, Case C-2Imm[1990] ECR 3365, and Cordoniu SA v. E.C. Council. 
Case C-309/89, [1994] ECR I-1853. The development of the concept of procedural fairness beyond the basic 
Article 190 duty to give reasons in the joined Cases C-6 9/90, Andrea Francovich and Dinila Bonifaci and 
others v. Italian Republic [1991] ECR 5357 and the progressive adoption of Human Rights into EC law, in the 
cases of Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v. Einfuhr- und Vorrasstelle fur Getreide und 
Futtermittel [1970] ECR 1125, and Case 46/87, Hoechst v. Commission [1989] ECR 2859, as subsequently 
followed by Article F(2) of the Treaty on European Union, all evidence the proactive approach of the ECJ to EC 
Law. 
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final appellate court of the case. Under Article 3(1) of the Brussels 
Convention, however, preliminary rulings or interpretations on any 
aspect of the Convention may be sought by the national courts only 
“when they are sitting in an appellate capacity” and by the courts granted 
jurisdiction to hear appeals against decisions authorizing enforcement by 
Article 37 of the Brussels Convention. First instance courts may not refer 
a matter on the Brussels Convention to the ECJ.24  
 
 A further difference refers to an unusual further jurisdiction arises 
under Article 4 of the Protocol of the Convention whereby a ruling on 
interpretation may be sought from the Court by authorities other that the 
courts specified in Article 2 of the Protocol. This jurisdiction only arises 
where a mater is already res judicitia and one or more decisions given by 
the Courts of the Contracting States conflict with a previous 
interpretation given either by the Court of Justice or by a Court of Appeal 
of another Contracting State. This final form of referral is for the future 
reference of the relevant jurisdiction only, as any judgment by the ECJ 
will have no impact whatsoever on the facts of the case originally in 
question. This, as stated by Francesco Capotorti,25 despite the provision’s 
lack of use, is a substantial departure from the procedures set out by the 
Treaty of Rome for its own application. The above factors would appear 
to militate strongly against the “Supreme Law” argument, whereby 
national rules of jurisdiction should be subordinated, proposed by the 
Commission is its written submission in Kongress Agentur Hagen v. 
Zeehahgen,26 and to favour the framework argument.  
 
 Where the convention prescribes a legal position27 or procedure28 
(i.e. rights of appeal)29 the Convention does takes precedence over 
national provisions.30 There are many issues, however, not addressed at 
all by the Convention, thus leading to an undue reliance on national 
                                                          
24
 Case 80/83, Habourdin v. Italocremona [1983] ECR 3639. 
25
 op cit., footnote no. 10. 
26
 op cit., footnote no. 8. 
27
 as in the case of Article 39 which deals with enforcement matters; Capelloni & Aquilini v. Pelkmans (Case 
119/84), [1985] ECR 3147. 
28
 Case 42/76, De Wolf  v. Cox [1976] ECR 1759. 
29
 The Convention itself “constitutes an autonomous and complete system of appeals” according the Court in 
paragraph 17 of its judgment in the case of Deutsche Genossenschaftsbank v. S.A. Brasserie du Pecheur, Case 
148/84, [1985] ECR 1981. 
30
 In the case of Duijnstee v. Lodewijk Gorerbauer Case 288/82, [1983] ECR 3663, (reference for a preliminary 
ruling from the Hoge Raad der Nederlanden), the Court held at point 15 of its judgment  that the Convention 
“which seeks to determine the jurisdiction of the courts of the Contracting States in civil matters must over ride 
national provisions which are incompatible with it”. 
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law,31 and thus supporting the framework argument. Such matters include 
problems arising from the defective service of the document instituting 
proceedings32 and issues dealing with the assessment of the quantum of 
damages.33 Here national law is utilized on condition that its application 
does not impair the “effectiveness” of the Convention.”34 Other issues are 
dealt with by specific reference to the national laws of the court seized, 
such as the law applicable to the legal relationship in question. National 
laws are also used to determine the place of performance of the 
contractual obligation.35 “As there is no uniformity among the laws of the 
contracting parties permitting a standard determination of the ‘place of 
performance’, there is no alternative but to let the court seized interpret 
this rule, according to the international private law of the lex fori”.36 
Another example of reliance on national law arises under Article 21, 
which refrains from introducing any procedures for the automatic 
consolidation of cases. This is evidenced in the case of Tarty v. Maciej 
Rataj.37 In the earlier case of Deutsche Genossenschaftsbank v. SA 
Brasserie du Pecheur38 Advocate General Lenz, adopting the stance of 
the German authorities accepted that, where procedures are 
circumscribed in the Brussels Convention, they are applicable 
exclusively. It must be noted that the exclusion of procedures under 
national laws “does not extend beyond the field of application of the 
uniform rules provided for in the Convention”: it is for national law to 
determine any extraneous matters.39 
 
                                                          
31
 to include an Action Paulienne, Case C-261/90, Reichert and Kockler v. Dresdner Bank [1992] ECR 2175, and 
non  enforcement of settlements, Case C-414/92, Solo Kleinmotoren GmbH v. Boch [1994] ECR I-2237. 
32
 which are governed by the lex fori, including, where applicable, relevant international agreements Case C 
305/88 Isabelle Lancray S.A.  v. Peters und Sickert [1990] ECR I-2725. 
33
 Case C-68/93 Fiona Shevill v. Press Alliance [1995] ECR 1-450. 
34
 The 1968 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in civil and commercial 
matters: The Evolution of the Text and the case law of the court of Justice over the last four years. S. Pieri. 
CMLR 29 537-555. 
35
 C-288/92, Custom Made Commercial v. Stawa Metallbau, [1994] ECR 1-2949, confirming (Case 12/76 
Industrie Tessili Italiana v. Dunlop A.G. [1976]ECR 1473, and Case 266/85, Shenavai v. Kreischer [1987] 
ECR 239. 
36
 The 1968 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
matters: The Evolution of the Text and the case law of the court of Justice over the last four years. S. Pieri. 
CMLR 29 537-555. 
37
 Case C-406/92, Tarty v. Maciej Rataj [1994] ECR 1-5460. 
38
 Case 148/84, Deutsche Genossenschaftsbank v. SA Brasserie du Pecheur [1984] ECR 1981. 
39
 Interested third parties were prevented from challenging enforcement orders in this case. 
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 Renhold Geimer points out40 that, not only do many procedural 
requirements fall under national laws, but so do questions of substantive 
law, as evidenced above in Industrie Tessili Italiana v. Dunlop A.G.41 
The ECJ itself stated in the case of Sanicentral GmbH v. Collin that “the 
Convention does not affect rules of substantive law”, but rather the role 
of the Convention is to “determine the jurisdiction of the courts of the 
contracting states in the intra-Community legal order”. 42 
 
 Matters relating to the execution on foot of a judgment are also to 
be determined according to national law. In his opinion on the case of 
Hoffmann v. Kreig,43 Advocate General Darmon stated that, despite the 
fact that the Convention laid down an exhaustive list of the rights of 
appeal available,44 “the Convention merely regulates the procedure for 
obtaining an order for the enforcement of foreign enforceable 
instruments” and that its execution is to be governed by the domestic law 
of the court where the execution is sought. 
 
 As the whole purpose of the Brussels Convention is the 
enforcement of judgments in other EU Member States this is a very 
significant area of substantive and procedural law which the Brussels 
Convention does not even attempt to address. However, problems do not 
end here. Other problems that may be encountered in the enforcement of 
judgments include issues pertaining to family or divorce matters,45 or to 
the enforceability of some cases in the country of enforcement for 
national reasons.46 
 
Plurality of Interpretation.  
 
 One of the consequences of the Framework construct of the 
Brussels Convention (with the consequence lack of a Supreme Court 
approach on the part of the ECJ) is plurality of interpretation. This may 
                                                          
40
 “Right of Access to the courts under the Brussels Convention”: European Court of Justice: Civil Jurisdiction and 
Judgments in Europe, Proceedings of the Colloquium on the Interpretation of the Brussels Convention by the 
Court of Justice considered in the context of the European Judicial Area. Luxembourg, 11and 12 March 191, 
Butterworths 1992, page 40. 
41
 Case 12/76, Industrie Tessili Italiana v. Dunlop A.G [1976] ECR 1473. 
42
 Case 25/79, Sanicentral GmbH v. Collin [1972] ECR 3423, (preliminary ruling requested by the Cour de 
Cassation of France), at point 6 of its judgment. 
43
 Case 145/86, [1988] ECR 645, (reference for a preliminary ruling from the Hoge Radd der Nederlanden). 
44
  See Case 148/84, Deutsche Genossenschaftsbank v. S.A. Brasserie du Pecheur SA [1985] ECR 1981. 
45
 Case 145/86, Hoffman v. Kreig [1988] ECR 645. 
46
 Case 42/76, de Wolf v. Harry Cox [1976] ECR 1759. 
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arise with regard to the Brussels Convention to an extent not possible 
under the EC Treaty. This is demonstrated in the case of De Bloos v. 
Bouyer,47 which involved language problems in the interpretation of the 
phrase “the place where the obligation has been or should be 
performed”.48 The case turned on the term “obligation” with Belgian 
commentators (the referring jurisdiction) unable to provide a satisfactory 
definition of same.49 Different language versions of the Brussels 
Convention provided different interpretations of the term, with the ECJ 
eventually determining that “obligation” referred to the contractual 
obligation forming the basis of the legal proceedings, reflecting the 
Italian and German version of the Convention. This situation, where the 
ECJ feels itself constrained by the language of the Convention with the 
result that it tries to stick rigidly to its wording, is less likely to occur in 
the context of the application of the EC Treaty, particularly when the 
Court operates in a Supreme Court style mode, as in the case of Parti 
Ecologiste Les Verts v. European Parliament,50 where the Court went so 
far as to insert the word “Parliament” into Article 173 EEC. 
 
 
Concluding remarks. 
 
  As has been evidenced by the afore mentioned cases of 
Francovich51 and Zwartveld,52 the very issue of the “international” 
recognition of judgments is also uncharacteristic of the general tenor of 
EC law developments over the past number of years. The international 
treaty status of the Brussels Convention is based upon a vision of the EU 
as being composed of independent states, coming together for a limited 
purpose. The increasing emphasis on unity, has been negated in this 
important area of law. This Convention emphasizes the disparities within 
the Member States in the process for enforcement of judgments, and 
makes no effort whatsoever to harmonize them. The case of Kongress 
Agentur Hagen v. Zeehaghe53 was decided against the backdrop of the 
                                                          
47
 Case 14/76, De Bloos v. Bouyer [1976] ECR 1497. 
48
 op cit., footnote no. 36. 
49
 The choice presented to the court was whether the term “obligation” referred to the obligation to compensate or 
the obligation to perform the contract in question.  
50
 Case 294/83, Parti Ecologiste Les Verts v. European Parliament [1986] ECR 1339. 
51Joined Cases C-6 9/90, Andrea Francovich and Dinila Bonifaci and others v. Italian Republic [1991] ECR 
5357. 
52
 Case C-2Imm, J.J.Zwartveld and others [1990] ECR 3365. 
53
 op cit., footnote no. 8. 
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above cases, and at the hearing, was the subject matter of two conflicting 
submissions of the Commission: 
1. That the Convention could be supplemented by procedural rules, and  
2. The Convention was part of the integral legal order of the Community, 
and all emphasis should be placed on uniform application of the 
Convention. After considering the arguments, the Court held in its 
judgment, at paragraph 17 thereof, that the object of the Convention “is 
not to unify procedural rules but to determine which court has 
jurisdiction in disputes relating to civil and commercial matters in intra-
Community relations and to facilitate the enforcement of judgments”.54 
 
 Echoing the opinion of Droz,55 the Convention is an entirely 
original, dynamic and effective legal entity, and as Advocate General 
Marco Darmon has pointed out, “The Brussels Convention constitutes 
the Community’s first achievement in the field of international private 
law”,56 but as such, regard must be had to the fact that the purpose of the 
Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments 1968 
is not to unify the procedural rules, as stated by the ECJ in the judgment 
in the case of Kongress Agentur Hagen v. Zeehaghe,57 nor in certain 
situations, the substantive rules.  
 
 This international trend58 introduces a note of tension into the 
European legal order. We are no longer all progressing along the same 
road, but we have shown a willingness, not only to slow down, but to 
turn around and go backwards. This move is reinforcing the concept of “a 
Europe of bits and pieces”,59 a move that has also been noted in other 
areas of European law. While the Convention might have been the 
product of a more realistic approach to solving the particular problem 
posed at the time, avoiding the thornier issues of approximation or 
unification of national laws, it may prove to be, in time, a stumbling 
                                                          
54
 The Court went on to state that there was a necessity to clearly distinguish between jurisdiction, and the 
conditions governing admissibility. 
55
 Competence Judicaire et Effects des Judgments dans le Marche Commun, (1972), referred to in Anton & 
Beaumonts Civil Jurisdiction in Scotland. 
56
 op cit., footnote no. 18. 
57
 Op cit., footnote no.8 
58
 commenced by the Brussels Convention on the International Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments, OJ 
No. L 229, 31.12.72, and as subsequently developed by the EEC Convention on the Law applicable to 
Contractual Obligations, Rome 1980, OJ L 1980 No. 266/1, and the EU Convention on International Insolvency 
Proceedings, Brussels November 23rd, 1995, 35 ILM 1236 (1996), (which is due to come into force as soon as 
the last Member State signs same). 
59
 Deirdre Curtain, “The Constitutional Structure of the Union”, A Europe of bits and pieces” (1993) 30 CMLRev 
17. 
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block in the quest for the development of a true European Union. The 
UK recognizing the inherent rigidity of the Brussels Convention had 
advocated the need for greater flexibility along the lines of the common 
law doctrine of “forum non conveniens” at the 1978 accession 
negotiations, but to no avail.60 
 
 The Brussels Convention has a very potent effect, as every court in 
a Contracting State is required to apply same. This is the case, according 
to the Jenard report,61 whether or not the Convention is pleaded by the 
parties. This report was granted the status of an interpretative document, 
as evidenced by section 3(3) of the UK’s enacting legislation, the Civil 
Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982,62 which provides that the separate 
reports accompanying each of the Accession Conventions are to be 
considered by the English courts in cases requiring the application of the 
Convention. 
 
 The usefulness of the Brussels Convention can be determined by 
its day to day application in the courts of EU Member States. The 
processing of claims for monetary judgments and their subsequent 
enforcement is very much part of the day to day operations of regional 
courts in each Member State, with many of the claims emanating from 
the lowest courts. With the greater mobility of all sectors of society 
between countries the issue of the international recognition of judgments 
is no longer the preserve of big business, but encompasses every EU 
citizen. 
 
 Access to the ECJ to determine issues which might arise under the 
administration of the Brussels Convention is severely restricted, with (as 
referred to earlier), only Article 2 courts being given the right to refer 
matters to the ECJ. Appeals to a higher court in the land simply to 
facilitate such a referral to the ECJ is therefore adding unnecessary 
burden and expense to the plaintiff. Such an additional burden could 
restrict access to justice for many smaller claimants. 
 
 The Convention, by relying on national law to the extent that it 
does, is held to ransom by the national courts and their domestic 
provisions dealing with judgments. A new EU system for recognition of 
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 The Option of Litigating in Europe. Edited by D.L.Carey Miller and Paul R. Beaumont. United Kingdom 
National Committee of Comparative Law. “The 1968 Brussels Convention and Subsequent Development” Karl 
M Newman. 
61
 Jenard Report, (OJ No. C59, 5.3.1979). 
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judgments cannot be developed, as there is, (to date), no attempt to unify 
the substantive and procedural law in this area.63 Every judgment has to 
be governed by two national laws, the main law of the forum of the 
judgment, and that of the forum of enforcement. One lawyer is unlikely 
to be sufficiently proficient in two legal systems to prosecute any case to 
its conclusion. Two legal teams on one judgment case continues to make 
the international recognition and enforcement of judgments unwieldy and 
cumbersome, with the free movement of judgments lagging a long way 
behind the other freedoms, thereby handicapping the development of a 
true internal market. 
 
 This disjointed development of the European market makes it easy 
for a defendant to move either himself, his assets, or even his entire 
business from one jurisdiction to another, without permitting those who 
seek to enforce a judgment against him an equal opportunity to avail of 
the lowering of the internal EU borders. Similarly, the full potential of 
pan-European commerce requires a seamless and effective method of 
enforcing contracts through judgments, such a system being a far cry 
from that currently available under the Brussels Convention. 
 
 Free movement of judgments, as with the other free movements, 
requires the supreme European court, the ECJ, to operate in a 
Constitutional manner with full authority to develop and evolve the 
provisions of a judgment recognition system, as necessity demands, 
without issues falling outwith the European law system, and relying on 
national laws and procedures, which have been developed for purposes 
other than pan-European enforcement of judgments. Problems arising 
from the strict interpretation of the Brussels Convention in its various 
language formats should never nave been permitted to arise, and would 
have been less likely to have arisen had the Brussels Convention been 
developed within the EC legal system.  
 
 This lack of identity as EC law, deriving from the EC Treaty, 
stifles the Convention’s potential. It is not an organic law capable of 
growth and development by the careful nurturing of the ECJ, under its 
more pro-active, Supreme Court style of judicial decisions, making it 
very much a legal document which operates as a “blunt instrument”64 was 
born fully developed, any further progress to be made in this area will 
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have to be done by way of a further international convention,65 while 
practitioners and public alike suffer from a system that is still, on many 
occasions, determined by national laws and procedures, with a true single 
commercial market in matters of European recognition of enforcement of 
judgments in civil matters a long way off. 
                                                          
65
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